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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this case of first impression, we consider whether 
the broad discretionary standard set forth in Brillhart v. Excess 
Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), or the more narrow 
"exceptional circumstances" test enunciated in Colorado River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), 
applies to a district court's decision to dismiss an interpleader 
action commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993), in favor of 
parallel state court proceedings.  Guided by the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., ___ U.S. ___, 115 
S. Ct. 2137 (1995), where the Court determined that the Brillhart 
standard applies in declaratory judgment actions, we hold that a 
motion to dismiss a federal statutory interpleader action during 
the pendency of a parallel state court proceeding is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the district court.  
 Following the commencement of this section 1335 
interpleader action, one of the defendant-claimants commenced a 
state court action.  After the district court determined that the 
requirements of the statute had been met, but before the dispute 
to the stake had been adjudicated, this defendant filed a motion, 
essentially requesting that the district court defer to the state 
4 
court action.  Conflating the two-step nature of an interpleader 
action, the district court was of the belief that all federal 
claims had been eliminated and terminated the case.  Instead, the 
court should have exercised its discretion to decide in which 
forum, federal or state, the unresolved dispute to the stake 
could be better determined.  We will, therefore, vacate the 
district court's termination order and remand the case for the 
court to make this decision.   
 
I. 
 Since its commencement, this case has taken a number of 
procedural twists and turns.  We begin by reviewing those aspects 
of its history that are relevant to the issues before us. 
          On February 15, 1994, NYLife Distributors, Inc., the 
averred administrator of the "Mainstay Mutual Fund", filed a 
complaint in interpleader in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993),0 
against The Adherence Group, Inc. ("TAG")0 and several TAG 
employees, including Joseph Gerasolo, the company's former 
                                                           
0
 Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also 
a provision for interpleader.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.  While both 
statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993), and rule 
interpleader allow a person holding property to join in a single 
suit two or more persons asserting claims to that property, they 
are dissimilar in several ways; most notably, unlike statutory 
interpleader which confers subject matter jurisdiction on the 
federal courts, rule interpleader is purely procedural.  Rule 22 
interpleader is not implicated in, nor is it relevant, to this 
appeal. 
0
 The Adherence Group, Inc. refers to itself in its 
briefs as "TAG" and we adopt that designation. 
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President0 and Patrick Bleach, its former Executive Vice 
President.  NYLife is a New York corporation; TAG is organized 
under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of 
business in New Jersey; Gerasolo is a citizen of New York; and 
Bleach is a citizen of New Jersey.  
 In its complaint, NYLife asserted that it was subject 
to conflicting demands from the defendants for monies it was 
holding in Mainstay Mutual Fund accounts opened for TAG employees 
in connection with TAG's executive compensation plan.0  Claiming 
no interest in the money, NYLife further alleged that it intended 
to deposit the money with the court and requested that the 
defendants be required to interplead and settle among themselves 
their respective rights to the fund.  On February 16, 1994, the 
individual defendants' total balance in the Mainstay Mutual Fund, 
which amounted to $215,489.50, was deposited in the court's 
Registry.  
          On March 7, 1994, Gerasolo and Bleach filed an answer 
to the interpleader complaint averring, inter alia, that TAG's 
claims were barred by certain settlement agreements, and brought 
a counterclaim against NYLife, alleging that NYLife's liquidation 
                                                           
0
 Elizabeth Gerasolo, Joseph Gerasolo's wife, was also 
joined as a defendant in the interpleader action.  For the sake 
of convenience, we will refer to Joseph and Elizabeth Gerasolo 
collectively as "Gerasolo". 
0
      More specifically, NYLife alleged that at about the same 
time it received a letter from TAG's attorney advising that 
"monies . . . had been improperly diverted from [TAG] to the 
[Mainstay Mutual Fund] accounts of the individual defendants . . 
." and directing that "no funds be distributed from any of the 
accounts of the individual defendants until further notice[]", it 
received a request from one of the individual defendants for 
money from his Mainstay Mutual Fund account.   
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of their respective Mainstay Mutual Fund accounts was a breach of 
contractual and fiduciary duties.  Additionally, Gerasolo and 
Bleach filed a cross-motion requesting, inter alia, that NYLife's 
interpleader action be dismissed, except for the purpose of 
determining the damages they had allegedly sustained as a result 
of NYLife's actions. 
 On March 17, 1994, TAG filed an answer to NYLife's 
complaint, admitting that it and the individual defendants had 
subjected NYLife to conflicting claims for Mainstay Mutual Fund 
monies. 
 Shortly thereafter, on March 23, 1994, TAG and its sole 
shareholder, TAG/SCIB Services A.G., commenced an action in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, against Gerasolo 
and Bleach, alleging that they had wrongfully appropriated TAG 
assets, including the monies deposited in the Mainstay Mutual 
Fund, through fraud, embezzlement and conversion, and against the 
Moore Stephens Accounting Firm, TAG's auditor, for failure to 
uncover the fraud.  The complaint was later amended on July 20, 
1994, to join the law firm of Connell, Losquadro & Zerbo and 
unknown "John Doe" fictional defendants for allegedly conspiring 
with Gerasolo and Bleach to defraud TAG. 
 On May 19, 1994, the district court issued an order 
granting NYLife's motion for a judgment in interpleader in the 
amount of $215,489.50; dismissing NYLife from the case and from 
any future liability for the payment of the money into the court 
Registry; ordering that the defendants be enjoined from 
instituting any other action against NYLife or its affiliates 
7 
based on NYLife's commencement of the interpleader action; 
awarding NYLife its attorneys' fees and costs; and dismissing the 
cross-motion for dismissal and counterclaim against NYLife that 
Gerasolo and Bleach had filed. 
 On June 1, 1994, Gerasolo and Bleach filed an amended 
answer to the interpleader complaint, adding cross-claims against 
TAG under New Jersey law for breach of contract, violations of 
the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, 34 N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 19-1 et seq. (1988), and malicious abuse of process. 
 Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery. 
 On July 7, 1995, TAG filed a motion asking the district 
court to dismiss the cross-claims Gerasolo and Bleach had 
asserted against it and to transfer the interpleaded fund to the 
Superior Court of New Jersey; in the alternative, TAG asked the 
court to retain the fund while the parties litigated their 
entitlement to the money in the action TAG had commenced in the 
New Jersey state court. 
 By order dated October 26, 1994, the district court 
granted TAG's motion.  Of the view that its May 19, 1994 order, 
which granted NYLife's motion for judgment in interpleader, 
denied Gerasolo's and Bleach's cross-motion for dismissal of the 
interpleader action and dismissed the counterclaim against 
NYLife, had "eliminat[ed]" all federal claims in this case[]", 
the court concluded that TAG was requesting that the court invoke 
its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1993) and decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Gerasolo's and Bleach's 
state law cross-claims.  Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), which 
8 
provides that a district court "may decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district 
court has dismissed claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction[]", the court decided not to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction over the cross-claims based on its 
belief that no federal claims remained in the case.  Accordingly, 
in its October 26, 1994 order, the court dismissed the cross-
claims, retained jurisdiction over the interpleaded fund pending 
the outcome of the state court litigation (at which time the 
party who prevails in the state court may apply to the district 
court for a distribution of the fund) and administratively 
terminated the case.   
 Gerasolo and Bleach bring this appeal from the district 
court's October 26, 1994 order, contending that due to the 
court's misinterpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1335, it in effect 
improperly "abstained" from this statutory interpleader action.0 
 
II. 
 The federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
(1993), is a remedial device which enables a person holding 
property or money to compel two or more persons asserting 
mutually exclusive rights to the fund to join and litigate their 
                                                           
0
 The district court's October 26, 1994 order turned on 
its interpretation of the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1335, which then formed the basis of the court's application of 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 
(1993).  Accordingly, our review is plenary.  See Air Courier 
Conference of Am./Int'l Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 959 
F.2d 1213, 1217, n.3 (3d Cir. 1992) (statutory construction or 
interpretation is a legal issue subject to plenary review). 
9 
respective claims in one action.  3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's 
Federal Practice § 22.02[1] (2d ed. 1994).  The benefits of the 
device to both the stakeholder and the claimants are substantial. 
It relieves the stakeholder from determining at his peril the 
merits of competing claims and shields him from the prospect of 
multiple liability; it gives the claimant who ultimately prevails 
ready access to the disputed fund.  Id. 
 Section 1335 grants original jurisdiction to the 
district courts over interpleader actions and sets forth certain 
requirements that must be met before the action may be 
maintained.  For example, although the citizenship of the 
stakeholder is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, the 
statute calls for diversity of citizenship between two or more of 
the adverse claimants, requires that the amount in controversy, 
which is measured by the value of the stake, be $500, and compels 
the stakeholder to deposit the money or property at issue in the 
court's Registry or, in the alternative, to give a bond payable 
to the clerk of courts in the appropriate amount.0  28 U.S.C. 
                                                           
0
 Section 1335 provides: 
 
§ 1335. Interpleader 
 
 (a) The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action of 
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader 
filed by any person, firm, or corporation, 
association, or society having in his or its 
custody or possession money or property of 
the value of $500 or more, or having issued a 
note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, 
or other instrument of value or amount of 
$500 or more, or providing for the delivery 
or payment or the loan of money or property 
10 
§ 1335(a).  Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) provides for 
nationwide service on all claimants in statutory interpleader 
actions and allows a district court in a section 1335 
interpleader case to enjoin any state or federal proceedings 
affecting the stake; 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1993) provides that 
section 1335 interpleader cases may be brought where one or more 
of the claimants reside.0 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of such amount or value, or being under any 
obligation written or unwritten to the amount 
of $500 or more, if 
 
 (1) Two or more adverse claimants, of 
diverse citizenship as defined in section 
1332 of this title, are claiming or may claim 
to be entitled to such money or property, or 
to any one or more of the benefits arising by 
virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy 
or other instrument, or arising by virtue of 
any such obligation; and if (2) the plaintiff 
has deposited such money or property or has 
paid the amount of or the loan or other value 
of such instrument or the amount due under 
such obligation into the registry of the 
court, there to abide the judgment of the 
court, or has given bond payable to the clerk 
of the court in such amount and with such 
surety as the court or judge may deem proper, 
conditioned upon the compliance by the 
plaintiff with the future order or judgment 
of the court with respect to the subject 
matter of the controversy. 
 
 (b) Such an action may be entertained 
although the titles or claims of the 
conflicting claimants do not have a common 
origin, or are not identical, but are adverse 
to and independent of one another. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993). 
0
 Section 2361 states: 
 
§ 2361. Process and procedure 
 
11 
 An action commenced under section 1335 typically 
involves two steps:  during the first, the district court 
determines whether the requirements of the statute have been met 
and whether the stakeholder may be relieved from liability; 
during the second, it actually adjudicates the defendants' 
adverse claims to the interpleaded fund.  New York Ins. Co. v. 
Connecticut Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1983); 7 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 7 Federal Practice and Procedure 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
      In any civil action of interpleader 
or in the nature of interpleader under 
section 1335 of this title, a district court 
may issue its process for all claimants and 
enter its order restraining them from 
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in 
any State or United States court affecting 
the property, instrument or obligation 
involved in the interpleader action until 
further order of the court.  Such process and 
order shall be returnable at such time as the 
court or judge thereof directs, and shall be 
addressed to and served by the United States 
marshals for the respective districts where 
the claimants reside or may be found. 
 
 Such district court shall hear and 
determine the case, and may discharge the 
plaintiff from further liability, make the 
injunction permanent, and make all 
appropriate orders to enforce its judgment. 
 
28 U.S.C.§ 2361 (1994). 
  
          Section 1397 states: 
 
          §  1397.  Interpleader 
 
                    Any civil action of interpleader or in  
          the nature of interpleader under section 1335  
          of this title may be brought in the judicial district             
in which one or more of the claimants reside.   
 
28 U.S.C. §1397 (1993). 
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§ 1714 (2nd ed. 1986).  The second stage, which proceeds like any 
other action, is ultimately resolved by the entry of a judgment 
in favor of the claimant who is lawfully entitled to the stake. 
See Diamond Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenues, 
422 F.2d 532, 534 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 Here the district court completed the first step of 
interpleader on May 19, 1994, when it granted NYLife's motion for 
a judgment in interpleader and discharged NYLife from liability. 
The court did not, however, proceed to section 1335's second step 
-- the unresolved dispute between the claimants for the 
interpleaded fund, which was, like the first, within the court's 
original jurisdiction.  We thus hold that the district court's 
conclusion that all federal claims had been dismissed by virtue 
of its May 19, 1994 order was in error, and that its October 26, 
1994 decision to terminate the case in favor of TAG's pending 
state court action on this basis was as well erroneous.  It 
necessarily follows and we further conclude that the district 
court erred when it also dismissed Gerasolo's cross-claims under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1993) on October 26, 1994, believing that 
all claims over which it had original jurisdiction had been 
eliminated from the case.   
 Our analysis, however, does not end here.  We turn next 
to the legal principles that are implicated by that portion of 
TAG's motion which in effect requested that the interpleader 
action be dismissed so as to allow the parties to resolve their 
dispute over the Mainstay Mutual Fund monies in the New Jersey 




 It is, of course, the general rule that the mere 
pendency of a similar action in a state court does not require, 
nor even permit, a federal court to refuse to hear or to stay an 
action that is properly within its jurisdiction, and that both 
state and federal actions should go forward until one of them 
results in a judgment that may be asserted as res judicata in the 
other, McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1910). 
Nonetheless, three doctrines of abstention have evolved which 
allow the district courts to decline to hear cases over which 
they have jurisdiction.0  The parties are in agreement that these 
traditional abstention doctrines, which rest on considerations of 
proper constitutional adjudication or federal-state relations, do 
not apply in this case.   
 Over the years, an additional ground for dismissing or 
staying a federal action in favor of state court proceedings has 
developed; it is aimed at avoiding duplicative litigation and is 
premised on considerations which concern the efficient 
administration of judicial resources and the comprehensive 
                                                           
0
 The three traditional doctrines of abstention are: 
Pullman abstention, which is proper when a state court 
determination of a question of state law might moot or change a 
federal constitutional issue, Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman 
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford abstention, which applies when 
questions of state law in which the state has expressed a desire 
to establish a coherent policy on a matter of substantial public 
concern are raised, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); 
and Younger abstention, which is appropriate where, absent bad 
faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal 
jurisdiction has been invoked to restrain state criminal 
proceedings.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
14 
disposition of cases.  See Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).  In our view, 
it is this additional category that is raised here. 
 
A. 
 Some fifty years ago, in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 
316 U.S. 491 (1942), the Supreme Court held that the district 
courts may decline to hear lawsuits brought under the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), in favor of 
pending state actions for reasons of judicial economy, even where 
they have jurisdiction.  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., ___ U.S. ___, 
115 S. Ct. 2137, 2140 (1995).  In Brillhart, the Excess Insurance 
Company of America commenced a declaratory judgment in federal 
court to determine its rights under a reinsurance agreement with 
Central Mutual Insurance Company.  Subsequently, Excess Insurance 
was joined in a Missouri state court garnishment proceeding that 
had been brought by Dewey Brillhart, the administrator of an 
estate, against Central Insurance to collect on a default 
judgment.  Brillhart then moved to dismiss the declaratory 
judgment action, principally on the ground that the issues Excess 
Insurance raised could be decided in the state garnishment 
proceeding.  The district court granted Brillhart's motion to 
dismiss, apparently to avoid delay, without considering whether 
Excess Insurance's declaratory judgment claims could be resolved 
in the garnishment proceeding.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that dismissal of the 
declaratory judgment action was an abuse of discretion, and 
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remanded the case to the district court, directing it to proceed 
to the merits. 
 Reversing the court of appeals and remanding to the 
district court for another determination of the motion, the 
Supreme Court stated that "[a]lthough the [d]istrict [c]ourt had 
jurisdiction . . ., it was under no compulsion to exercise that 
jurisdiction[]", 316 U.S. at 494, and made clear that the 
district courts have the discretion to dismiss a declaratory 
judgment action when "it would be uneconomical as well as 
vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory 
judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court 
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between 
the same parties."  Id. at 495.  The Court did not articulate all 
of the considerations which should guide a district court's 
decision in this regard; it did provide, however, that the court 
"should ascertain whether the questions in controversy between 
the parties to the federal suit[] . . . can better be settled in 
the proceeding pending in state court[]", assess "the scope of 
the pending state proceeding and the nature of the defenses open 
there[]", and evaluate "whether the claims of all parties in 
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, 
whether necessary parties have been joined, [and] whether such 
parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc."  Id. 
 Later, in the 1976 Colorado River case, 424 U.S. at 
800, the Supreme Court revisited the propriety of a district 
court's decision to dismiss a federal suit in favor of a 
concurrent state court proceeding for reasons of judicial economy 
16 
and efficiency.  There, the government filed a complaint pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1993), which grants the district courts 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions commenced by the 
United States, against some 1,000 non-federal water users for a 
declaration of the government's rights to water in certain 
Colorado rivers and their tributaries.  Shortly after the federal 
suit was commenced, one of the defendants commenced a state 
proceeding for the purpose of adjudicating all government claims 
to the water, both state and federal.  Several parties in the 
federal action then filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the 
district court did not have jurisdiction.  Without deciding the 
jurisdictional question, the district court abstained.  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the district court had jurisdiction and that 
abstention was inappropriate.   
 Reversing the court of appeals' judgment, the Supreme 
Court confirmed that federal courts may, in appropriate 
circumstances, defer to state court proceedings for reasons of 
wise judicial administration, but, without discussing Brillhart, 
announced a very different standard.  424 U.S. at 817.  Where in 
Brillhart the Court warned district courts against "[g]ratuitous 
interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a 
state court litigation" and directed them to exercise discretion 
in deciding whether or not to proceed, 316 U.S. at 495, in 
Colorado River the Court referred to the "virtually unflagging 
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction 
given them[]", and set forth an "exceptional circumstances" test 
17 
of several factors that the district courts should utilize.  424 
U.S. at 817-18.  These factors are whether either court has 
assumed jurisdiction over property, the inconvenience of the 
federal forum, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the order 
in which the courts obtained jurisdiction.  Id. at 818. 
 Two years after its decision in Colorado River, the 
Court decided Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), 
which concerned an action for an alleged violation of the federal 
securities laws commenced in federal court during the pendency of 
a related state court case.  Relying on Brillhart, a plurality of 
the Court reversed the grant of a petition for a writ of mandamus 
ordering the district court to adjudicate the claim.  According 
to the plurality, Colorado River had not "undermined[d] the 
conclusion of Brillhart that the decision whether to defer to the 
concurrent jurisdiction of a state court is, in the last 
analysis, a matter committed to the district court's discretion." 
Id. at 664.  Four Justices, however, joined Justice Brennan's 
dissent, which took issue with the plurality's reliance on 
Brillhart and its disregard for the Colorado River exceptional 
circumstances test.  Id. at 668-77.  Chief Justice Burger, 
although concurring in the judgment, agreed with the dissent that 
the Colorado River test was controlling.  Id. at 668.  In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan observed that while Brillhart 
concerned an action for a declaratory judgment where federal 
jurisdiction is "discretionary", Calvert involved a claim under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which the federal courts 
18 
have been given "non-discretionary", exclusive jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 672. 
 Subsequently, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Court ruled that 
the Colorado River exceptional circumstances test, not the 
Brillhart discretionary approach, applies to a district court's 
decision to stay a diversity of citizenship action brought under 
section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 4, seeking an order compelling arbitration, id. at 14-19, and 
added two factors to the test -- which forum's substantive law 
governs the merits of the litigation and the adequacy of the 
state forum to protect the parties' rights.  Id. at 26.  In doing 
so, the Court rejected the argument that Calvert had changed the 
law, noting that the majority of the Court in Calvert reaffirmed 
the Colorado River exceptional circumstances test, id. at 17, and 
that Calvert was distinguishable, since it involved the issuance 
of a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, where the movant 
must show a clear and indisputable right to the writ, not a 
typical appeal.  Id. at 18. 
 Given these conflicting messages, not surprisingly 
circuit conflicts have arisen over the standard which governs a 
district court's decision to stay a declaratory judgment action 
in favor of parallel state proceedings; several courts, including 
our own, have applied the discretionary standard articulated in 
Brillhart, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau 
Federation, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778, n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) and 
Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 
19 
1989), while other courts applied the relatively narrow 
exceptional circumstances test developed in Colorado River. E.g., 
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Missouri Elec. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 
1372, 1374, n.3 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 Quite recently, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict 
in Wilton, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. at 2137, holding that the 
Brillhart discretionary standard governs a district court's 
decision to stay a federal declaratory judgment action during the 
pendency of parallel state court proceedings.  There a dispute 
between the Hill Group and other parties over the ownership and 
operation of oil and gas properties in Winkler County, Texas, was 
headed toward litigation.  The Hill Group asked London 
Underwriters to provide it with coverage under several insurance 
policies in the event it was sued; London Underwriters refused. 
Following a three-week trial in Winkler County, a jury verdict in 
excess of $100 million was entered against the Hill Group.  After 
the Hill Group gave London Underwriters notice of the verdict, 
the insurer filed an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V), in federal court, 
seeking a declaration that the policies did not cover the Hill 
Group's liability.  This action was voluntarily dismissed, but 
later refiled when the Hill Group sued London Underwriters on the 
insurance policies in a state court.  The Hill Group then moved 
to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay London Underwriters' 
declaratory judgment action.  Observing that the state lawsuit 
encompassed the coverage issues raised in the declaratory 
judgment action and concluding that a stay was warranted in order 
20 
to avoid piecemeal litigation, the district court issued a stay; 
noting that "'[a] district court has broad discretion to grant 
(or decline to grant) declaratory judgment[]'", the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 2139-40. 
 The Supreme Court also affirmed.  Its decision was 
premised on "[d]istinct features of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act," which in the Court's view, "justify a standard vesting 
district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment 
actions than that permitted under the `exceptional circumstances' 
test of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone."  Id. at 2142.  After 
noting the statute's "textual commitment to discretion" wherein a 
court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party seeking such a declaration," 28 U.S.C. §2201(a), 
and the "breadth of leeway [it has] always understood [the Act] 
to suggest", the Court concluded that "[b]y the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the 
district court's quiver"; it created "an opportunity, rather than 
a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants."  
Id. at 2143.  Accordingly, the Court held that "[c]onsistent with 
the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is 
authorized, in the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or 
to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment before trial 
or after all arguments have drawn to a close."  Id. (footnote 
omitted).  The Court further held that the district courts are 
vested with discretion to make these determinations in the first 
instance and that their decisions should be reviewed under the 
abuse of discretion standard.  Id. at 2144. 
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 We turn now to the standard that governs a district 
court's decision to dismiss or stay an interpleader action 
commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993), due to the pendency of 
concurrent state court proceedings. 
 
B. 
 At the outset, we observe that district courts have 
traditionally assumed that they possess broad equitable 
discretion to decline jurisdiction over a statutory interpleader 
lawsuit where in their view there is a pending state proceeding 
that obviates the need for the federal action.  In B. J. Van 
Ingen & Co. v. Connolly, 225 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1955), for 
example, when we affirmed the district court's dismissal of an 
interpleader action, we agreed that "in all the circumstances 
there was insufficient equity in the [plaintiff's] present 
complaint to make it incumbent upon a federal court to interfere 
by way of interpleader with what the state court [was] doing." 
Id. at 744.  We also observed that the district court had 
"properly considered and given weight" to the plaintiff's 
position in deciding that "[the plaintiff] might equitably be 
left to have its responsibility and duty with references to the 
fund in question decided in the comprehensive New Jersey suit." 
Id. at 743.  See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 
12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is well recognized that interpleader 
is an equitable remedy, and a federal court may abstain from 
deciding an interpleader action if another action could 
adequately redress the threat that the stakeholder might be held 
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doubly liable."); Koehring Co. v. Hyde Const. Co., 424 F.2d 1200, 
1202 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[A] federal district court [has] the 
discretion to dismiss an action in statutory interpleader on 
grounds of equity and comity, when the interests of the 
stakeholder and all claimants will be adequately protected in a 
pending state court proceeding[]".); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. 
Copeland, 398 F.2d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1968) ("The genesis of 
interpleader is equity, and we perceive no reason why it should 
be denied the remedial flexibility of a chancellor's decree. 
Thus, the district court can stay its proceedings [and] permit 
the parties to litigate ownership of the royalties in [state 
court] . . . ."); Equitable Assur. Soc. v. Porter-Englehart, 867 
F.2d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 1989) (agreeing that the federal courts may 
in their discretion dismiss or stay statutory interpleader 
actions in favor of ongoing state proceedings); Hickok v. Gulf 
Oil Co., 265 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1959) (same).  Contra Boston Old 
Colony Ins. Co. v. Balbin, 591 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that a district court may not abstain from an interpleader action 
where important state public policy and "unusual circumstances" 
are not present). 
 Our review has not produced nor have the parties 
suggested any cases which analyze the scope of a district court's 
discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993) to defer to state 
proceedings in light of the Supreme Court decisions we have 
discussed.  We believe our threshold inquiry is whether the 
exceptional circumstances test set forth in Colorado River 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), must 
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invariably be applied whenever a district court with jurisdiction 
considers a request to defer to a state court action.  In our 
view, it need not.  We read the Supreme Court's decisions, 
beginning with Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), 
and ending with Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. 
Ct. 2137 (1995), to instruct that the exceptional circumstances 
test is not universal and will yield in cases where the statute 
which grants a district court the authority to decide a matter 
"justif[ies] [as does the Declaratory Judgment Act] a standard 
vesting district courts with greater discretion . . . than that 
permitted under the `exceptional circumstances' test of Colorado 
River and Moses H. Cone."  See Wilton, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 
at 2140.  
 Accordingly, we look to the interpleader statute to 
determine which standard -- the discretionary approach taken in 
Brillhart or the exceptional circumstances test set forth in 
Colorado River -- governs a district court's decision to dismiss 
a federal interpleader action in favor of pending state 
proceedings.  We initially observe that historically and under 
the statute, interpleader is a suit in equity.  Sanders v. Armour 
Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 199 (1934); 4 J. Pomeroy, A 
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 1320 (5th ed. 1941).0  A 
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 The first federal Interpleader Act was passed in 1917. 
Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) (repealed 
1926).  The present provisions at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1993) and 28 
U.S.C. § 2361 (1994) are bottomed on the Act as amended in 1936. 
3A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, § 22.06 (2d ed. 
1994).  In the 1936 Act, the district courts were given original 
jurisdiction "[o]f suits in equity begun by bills of interpleader 
or bills in the nature of bills of interpleader . . . ."  Act of 
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federal interpleader court, therefore, by the nature of its 
jurisdiction proceeds with broad discretion.  Meredith v. City of 
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).  ("[A]n appeal to the 
equity jurisdiction conferred on [the] federal courts is an 
appeal to the sound discretion which guides the determinations of 
courts of equity.").  Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 
(1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of 
the chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case.  Flexibility rather than 
rigidity has distinguished it.").   
          Hence, one of two related questions we face is whether 
under section 1335, the district courts retain their traditional 
equitable discretion when deciding whether to hear a statutory 
interpleader case or defer to a state court; and the other is 
whether the district courts have a "virtually unflagging 
obligation" to exercise their section 1335 jurisdiction.  In this 
regard, we find the Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. 
Romeo-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), instructive.  There, the 
Court considered whether, under the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and 
Supp. IV), the district courts must enjoin violations of the Act 
or whether they retain the broad discretion that equity 
jurisdiction provides them in deciding issues of injunctive 
relief.  To decide the issue, the Court looked to the overall 
structure and language, purpose and legislative history of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096 (1936) (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)). 
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Act to determine whether Congress clearly intended to alter 
traditional equity practices, stating: 
`[T]he comprehensiveness of [the district 
court's] equitable jurisdiction is not to be 
denied or limited in the absence of a clear 
and valid legislative command.  Unless a 
statute in so many words, or by a necessary 
and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court's jurisdiction in equity, the full 
scope of that jurisdiction is to be 
recognized and applied.  The great principles 
of equity, securing complete justice, should 
not be yielded to light inferences or 
doubtful construction.' 
 
Id. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 
398 (1946)). 
 The Court cautioned, however, that "[of] course, 
Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the 
courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress 
has intended to depart from established principles."  Id. at 313. 
 Ultimately, the Court found nothing in the Clean Waters 
Act's language, structure, purpose or legislative history 
evidencing Congress' intent to deny the courts their traditional 
equitable discretion in deciding matters of equitable relief. Id. 
at 319.  Compare Bowles, 321 U.S. at 321 (holding that the phrase 
"shall be granted" in section 925 of the Emergency Price Control 
Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., does not mean that 
injunctions for violations of the Act are mandatory; "if Congress 
had intended to make such a drastic departure from the tradition 
of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would 
have been made.") with TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding 
that the plain language and purpose of the Endangered Species 
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Acts, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., contains a flat ban on the 
destruction of critical habitats, thereby foreclosing the 
exercise of the usual discretion possessed by a court of equity 
and requiring a district court to enjoin violations of the Act). 
 Against this backdrop, we turn to the text and 
structure, purpose and legislative history of section 1335 to 
determine the parameters of the district courts' discretion to 
decline jurisdiction and defer to state court proceedings for the 
sake of judicial administration and efficiency, looking 
specifically for any indication that Congress sought to limit a 
federal interpleader court's broad equitable discretion in such 
matters.    
 Starting with the statute's language and structure, we 
find that the text of section 1335, when considered with 28 
U.S.C. § 2361 (1994), is inconclusive.  Section 1335(b) of the 
interpleader statute provides that an action over which the 
district courts are granted original jurisdiction under section 
1335(a) "may be entertained", even where the titles to or claims 
of the conflicting claimants are adverse and independent of one 
another.  28 U.S.C. § 1335(b) (emphasis added).  Although section 
1335(b) is cast in discretionary terms, its permissive tone may 
relate solely to Congress' decision to abolish in the 
interpleader statute certain "historical limitations" that had 
been imposed on interpleader actions.  See 3A J. Moore & J. 
Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice §  22.11 (2d ed. 1994) (The four 
historical requisites to a strict bill of interpleader were "same 
debt, common origin, disinterested shareholder and the absence of 
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independent liability. . . .").   Section 2361, which authorizes 
the district courts to issue nationwide process and enjoin other 
actions affecting the stake, arguably suggests that a court may 
not decline to hear the case, stating that "[the] district court 
shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the 
plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, 
and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment."  28 
U.S.C. § 2361 (emphasis added).  We have not found any clues in 
other portions of section 13350 or section 2361 or in relevant 
legislative history to elucidate this language and its meaning. 
It does not seem likely, however, that at the same time Congress 
by way of section 2361 gave the district courts the considerable 
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 In support of their argument that the exceptional 
circumstances test set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), should guide a 
district court's decision to dismiss a federal interpleader 
action in favor of pending state proceedings, Gerasolo and Bleach 
rely heavily on section 1335(a), which states in pertinent part 
that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of 
interpleader. . . ."  28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1993) (emphasis 
added).  In our view, section 1335(a) represents Congress' 
decision to grant jurisdiction to the district courts in 
interpleader actions; it is not, as Gerasolo and Bleach urge, a 
directive on Congress' part that the district courts exercise 
that jurisdiction. 
 
 We note that Congress typically uses the language we 
see in 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) when granting jurisdiction to the 
district courts.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) ("The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the 
United States."); Id. § 1332(a) ("The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 . . . and is 
between -- (1) citizens of different States . . . . "); Id. §1345 
("[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions . . . commenced by the United States. . . ."). 
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tool of nationwide process, retained their equitable power to 
order injunctive relief, and even granted them injunctive 
authority over state courts, thereby exempting statutory 
interpleader actions from the proscriptions of the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994), it intended to narrow, 
if not eliminate, the district courts' discretion in deciding 
whether the issues raised in an interpleader action may be better 
resolved in a state court.  We thus see section 2361 as a source 
of authority for the district courts, not as a command to the 
courts to exercise jurisdiction.  We therefore resolve any 
ambiguities in sections 1335 and 2361 with regard to the district 
courts' capacity to decline jurisdiction in favor of that 
interpretation which preserves the courts' equitable discretion. 
See Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329. 
 As to the purpose of section 1335, it has long been 
recognized that the interpleader statute is remedial, aimed at 
assisting a party who fears the vexation of defending multiple 
claims to a fund or property under his control by providing him 
the opportunity to satisfy his obligation in a single proceeding. 
See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 
(1967).  Indeed, the trend over the years has been directed 
toward increasing the availability of interpleader and relaxing 
historical, technical restraints on the device.  For example, the 
first interpleader statute, passed in 1917, limited the district 
courts' jurisdiction to strict bills of interpleader brought by 
an insurance company or a fraternal beneficiary society, Act of 
Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917) (repealed 1926); by 
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1936, statutory interpleader was, as it still is, available to 
"any person, firm, corporation, association, or society. . . ." 
Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096 (1936) (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)).  Moreover, since initially 
enacted, statutory interpleader has been greatly broadened to 
include within its purview disputes concerning a wide range of 
obligations and competing claims.  Id. (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1335(a),(b)).0  See Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., The Federal 
Interpleader Act of 1936: I. and II., 45 Yale L.J. 963, 1161 
(1936).  This expansion of the remedy leads us to conclude that 
by the interpleader statute, Congress was more interested in 
providing an opportunity to litigants to resolve disputes, than 
in creating a duty in the district courts to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them therein. 
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 A Senate Report summarized the modifications made to 
the statute by the Act of 1936 as follows: 
 
 Bills in the nature of interpleader are 
included; 
 The class of parties entitled to use of 
the remedy is broadened; 
 The scope of interpleader is extended 
over other subjects than insurance; 
 The titles or claims supporting the 
action are extended; 
 The venue is made more convenient for 
claimants; 
 A bond is permitted as an alternative 
deposit; 
 Privity among claimants is abolished; 
 Interpleader is allowed defensively in 
actions at law. 
 
S. Rep. No. 558, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). 
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 Finally, although the statute's scant legislative 
history does not shed light on the question we are deciding, it 
does not reveal any evidence of intent on Congress' part to limit 
or otherwise alter traditional equity practice in section 1335 
cases or to make the interpleader remedy obligatory. 
 We thus hold that the discretionary standard enunciated 
in Brillhart governs a district court's decision to dismiss an 
action commenced under the interpleader statute during the 
pendency of parallel state court proceedings. 
 
IV. 
 In Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 
2137 (1995), the Court held that the decision to entertain a 
declaratory judgment action in view of a pending parallel state 
action is committed to the district courts in the first instance 
because "facts bearing on the usefulness of the . . . remedy, and 
the fitness of the case for resolution, are particularly within 
their grasp."  Id. at 2144.  We believe that the same holds true 
in interpleader cases brought under 28 U.S.C. §1335 (1993). Thus, 
this case must be remanded to the district court for it to 
exercise its sound discretion in deciding whether to dismiss this 
action in favor of the proceeding pending in the Superior Court 
of New Jersey. 
 On remand, the district court should determine, as a 
threshold matter, whether the state court action is indeed 
"parallel"; that is, whether it encompasses the competing claims 
to the Mainstay Mutual Fund monies that are raised here.  Since 
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the very basis for deference is the avoidance of needless 
duplicative litigation, the absence of a parallel state 
proceeding, as we have defined it in this context, would counsel 
against, if not proscribe, dismissal.  Thereafter, in considering 
TAG's motion, the district court should bear in mind that neither 
the mere pendency of a parallel state court action nor the mere 
presence of state law issues in this case would support 
dismissal; the court must remain cognizant of the purpose of the 
interpleader statute, ultimately determining where the competing 
claims that expose the stakeholder to multiple lawsuits and 
liability "can better be settled."  See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. 
Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).  In this regard, the court should 
evaluate which forum will protect the stakeholder more 
effectively while providing the claimants with the more 
efficient, convenient, and expeditious vehicle to settle their 
dispute to the fund.  We would also expect the district court to 
evaluate the conduct of the parties in litigating both the 
federal and state actions to ensure that procedural fencing, 
forum shopping or gamesmanship is not rewarded.  We do not intend 
the considerations we have enunciated to be comprehensive, and 
leave it to the district court to consider any other factors it 
finds relevant. 
 Finally, as the Court noted in Wilton, "where the basis 
for declining to proceed is the pendency of a state proceeding, a 
stay will often be the preferable course, insofar as it assures 
that the federal action can proceed without risk of a time bar if 
the state case, for any reason, fails to resolve the 
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controversy".  Id. at 2143, n.2.  Accordingly, the district court 
should also consider whether a stay of this action, rather than a 
dismissal, is appropriate, in the event it decides that the 
parties are to resolve the issues raised in this action in the 
state court.   
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's October 26, 1994 order and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings on the Adherence Group's 
July 7, 1994 motion which requested that the court defer to the 
New Jersey state court proceeding as to the interpleaded claims 
and dismiss the cross-claims brought against it by Gerasolo and 
Bleach. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
district court improperly terminated the interpleader 
proceedings, mistakenly believing that all federal claims had 
been dismissed.  Unlike the majority, however, I am of the 
opinion that, after concluding that jurisdiction was proper under 
28 U.S.C. § 1335 and dismissing the stakeholder from future 
liability, the district court was obligated to adjudicate the 
remainder of the interpleader proceeding.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent. 
 The majority opinion concludes that the broad 
discretionary standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), should 
be applied in this case.  I disagree.  Having completed the first 
stage of this interpleader proceeding, the district court was 
obligated to entertain the second stage of the proceeding, 
abstaining in favor of parallel state court proceedings only if 
exceptional circumstances required.  Thus, I would hold that the 
appropriate standard to apply in this case is the "exceptional 
circumstances" test established by the Supreme Court in Colorado 
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River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 
(1976). 
 I believe that the majority misinterprets the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., ___ U.S. 
___, 115 S.Ct. 2137 (1995).  In my opinion, Wilton restricts the 
application of Brillhart's discretionary standard to actions 
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act or similar statutes 
giving district courts express discretionary jurisdiction.  Id. 
at 2142.  Beyond the declaratory judgment context and in the 
absence of express language granting jurisdictional discretion, 
however, federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . 
. . to exercise the jurisdiction given them" by Congress.  Id.; 
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18.  Because this case clearly 
falls outside of the declaratory judgment context and because 
there is no statutory indication that there is a discretionary 
character to the second stage of an interpleader proceeding, 
Brillhart's broad discretionary standard should not be applied in 
this case.   
 In Wilton, the Court acknowledged that the suggestion 
"that Brillhart might have application beyond the context of 
declaratory judgments was rejected by the Court in Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 
927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)."  Wilton, 115 S.Ct. at 2142.  The 
Declaratory Judgment Act "has been understood to confer on 
federal courts unique and substantial discretion," id. (emphasis 
added), because it provides that a court "may declare the rights 
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking [a] 
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declaration."  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis 
added).  It is clear from the language of the Act that Congress 
intended federal courts to have discretion when deciding whether 
to hear actions involving declaratory relief. 
 Section 1335, however, contains no language indicating 
that Congress intended courts to have such jurisdictional 
discretion when adjudicating interpleader proceedings.  On the 
contrary, section 1335(a) provides that "[t]he district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of 
interpleader . . . ."0  28 U.S.C. § 1335(a).  Section 1335 was 
intended to allow more parties to bring interpleader actions in 
federal courts by broadening the availability and the nature of 
relief.  Congress therefore minimized diversity requirements, 
lowered the required amount in controversy, and provided for 
nationwide service of process.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1335(a) & 2361; see 
3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 22.11 (1995).  Nothing in prior 
Supreme Court decisions allows this court to carve out a 
discretionary niche based on the equitable nature of interpleader 
relief where Congress has clearly expressed its desire to provide 
a federal forum for diverse litigants.  "'[I]t was never a 
doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its 
judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a State 
court could entertain it.'"  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813-14 
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 While I agree with the majority's characterization of 
section 1335(b), I believe that the word "shall" in section 
1335(a) cannot be ignored merely because its use by Congress is 
"typical," as suggested by the majority opinion.  Op. at 27, 
n.10. 
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(quoting Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 
341 (1951)).   
 Abstention in favor of the state court proceeding is 
particularly disconcerting in this case because the federal 
proceeding was well underway.  Indeed, as discussed in the 
majority opinion, the first stage of the proceeding had been 
entirely completed:  the complaint was filed and answered, the 
court found that the jurisdictional requirements had been met and 
dismissed NYLife Distributors from the case and from any future 
liability.  The only thing remaining for the court to do was to 
resolve the dispute between the claimants for the interpleaded 
fund. 
 The federal court clearly had priority over this case. 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21 ("[P]riority should not be measured 
exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in 
terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions"). 
"It has been held . . . that the court first assuming 
jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the 
exclusion of other courts[.]"  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818, 
96 S.Ct. at 1246-47 (citing Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 
408, 412 (1964); Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 
(1939); United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 
463, 477 (1936)).  Thus, because the federal proceedings were 
clearly "prior" to the state action, dismissing the federal 
claims seems all the more like an unjust abdication of the 
court's duty to exercise jurisdiction granted. 
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 I dissent from the majority's opinion because it 
effectively reads diversity jurisdiction out of the interpleader 
statute whenever a similar action is pending in a state court. As 
with jurisdiction granted under the diversity statute, once a 
case is properly commenced in a federal court, the case should 
stay there unless there is a recognized reason for abstention or 
transfer.  I am disturbed by what I construe as the judicial 
destruction of a congressionally created federal remedy.  In my 
opinion, allowing courts broad authority to decide when to 
abstain from exercising jurisdiction clearly granted by Congress 
is an inappropriate exercise of judicial authority.   
 I would apply the more narrow Colorado River test here 
in order to adequately uphold federal jurisdiction and the 
purposes of the law.0  If Congress desires federal courts to have 
broad discretion to abstain from resolving disputes brought under 
the interpleader statute, then Congress, not this court, should 
make its desire clear by clarifying the language of the statute. 
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 I believe that this court may apply the exceptional 
circumstances test without remanding the issue to the district 
court given the adequacy of the record in this case.  The Supreme 
Court has articulated a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to 
a determination of whether exceptional circumstances exist.  That 
list includes:  "the assumption by either court of jurisdiction 
over a res, the relative convenience of the fora, avoidance of 
piecemeal litigation, the order in which jurisdiction was 
obtained by the concurrent fora, whether and to what extent 
federal law provides the rules of decision on the merits, and the 
adequacy of state proceedings."  Wilton, 115 S.Ct. at 2142. 
Balancing these factors "heavily weighted in favor of the 
exercise of jurisdiction," Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983), I would hold that 
the district court improperly abstained and should have exercised 
its jurisdiction by completing the adjudication properly 
commenced in federal court. 
